Publications

(Peer-Reviewed)

  • Do Gender Quotas Increase Political Knowledge?

    Forthcoming at the European Journal of Political Research (EJPR)

    Do gender quotas increase political knowledge? While some studies suggest that quotas can positively impact women’s political engagement and participation, others find null or negative effects. This paper focuses on Western Europe and argues that the implementation of quotas serves as an attention and consciousness-raising event, potentially enhancing awareness of the political sphere. To investigate this, I propose a novel research design that capitalizes on the (quasi) exogenous shock resulting from the introduction of gender quotas. By influencing symbolic representation, quotas may enhance women’s sense of empowerment, equality, and willingness to engage in politics. Furthermore, the impact is expected to be more pronounced among younger women due to the heightened political socialization experienced during adolescence. Thus, the institutional change brought about by quotas is anticipated to particularly boost political knowledge among (younger) women and subsequently narrow the gender gap. To examine this hypothesis, I analyze data from 1992 to 2018 from 12 countries, of which 6 implemented gender quotas. Using a hierarchical Bayesian model, I assess respondents’ answers to knowledge questions. The findings indicate that the introduction of gender quotas in parliamentary systems has a positive effect on reducing the gender gap in political knowledge among younger individuals, while the effects are statistically insignificant for older citizens.

Working Papers

  • Gender Quota Laws and Executive Power (with T. Barnes and A.C. Weeks)

    Do political gender quota laws increase women’s presence in cabinets worldwide? Women have traditionally been underrepresented in politics, especially in top leadership roles in government. As a remedy, political gender quota laws have now been adopted for the national parliaments of over 80 countries, requiring a certain percentage of women to be nominated as candidates or elected in reserved seats. We argue that gender quota laws increase the supply of potential women ministers, and also investigate potential demand-side effects. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we analyze the impact of gender quotas on the gender composition of cabinets over time in a global sample of countries from 1990 to 2022. We find that quotas increase the share of women in cabinets by 2.1 percentage points, with effects concentrated in parliamentary democracies that observe a high ‘shock’ to women in parliament post-quota and in low prestige portfolios, in line with our supply-side argument. Our findings suggest that gender quotas have important spillover effects that shape women’s prospects for representation in not only parliaments but also governments – although access to the highest offices remains elusive.

  • Stai Fuori or Benvenuto? Immigration and The Italian Far Right (with C. Reenock)

    How does exposure to new migrant populations influence support for far right parties? Fear of the unknown that accompanies a migrant influx may drive voter support for far right parties. On the other hand, the ‘contact thesis’ suggests that direct exposure to migrants will demystify the experience, thereby decreasing support for far right parties. Adjudicating between these accounts, however, is difficult given the challenges in disentangling the causal relationship between extant migrant populations and political support. We attempt to gain traction on this question by leveraging a natural experiment – the impact of the 2012 international migrant crisis on the 2018 Italian elections that gave rise to the far right government of (Vice) Prime Minister Matteo Salvini. We examine the shift in far right support between the 2013 and 2018 national elections across all 7984 Italian municipalities as a function of new migrants. To identify this causal relationship, we instrument migrants with a novel indicator -- the existence of a mid-to-large water port in a given municipality. We also use geocoded municipal data to test whether the contact thesis or an alternative account better explains suburban support (or punishment) at the polls for the addition of new migrants in a neighboring municipality.

Work in Progress

  • Do their Interests Matter? Finance Ministers and Wealth Inequality (with D. Alexiadou, M. Pelliquer, and E. Wegner)

  • Gender Differences in Information Acquisition and Participation (with M. Pietryka)

Publications

(Non Peer-Reviewed)

Dissertation

Strategic Candidate Selection and Minority Representation

How do parties negotiate strategies that trade off experienced candidates for diversity? On one hand, parties are strategic in nominating candidates: those with more experience are placed in higher positions on party lists. On the other hand, evidence from minority representation in national governments emphasizes parties’ efforts to enhance diversity to attract votes. However, we do not know how parties navigate potential tradeoffs between experience and diversity. In my dissertation, I propose a model in which two parties must select a combination of candidates based on their level of experience and diversity status to create a list. Subsequently, voters then vote for one of the parties following their preferences. I further extend the model to include the use of a quota that requires alternation between minority and majority candidates to investigate how quotas alter the parties’ strategic behavior. I examine whether the parties’ strategic incentives might be strong enough to prioritize their preferences, even when they are not aligned with the voters. I argue that some institutions make these tradeoffs more salient, even leading parties to reduce their diversity efforts.

I examine these theoretical results with two empirical tests. First, I use an original dataset of legislative party lists in Italy from 1993 to 2022 to examine whether and how parties modify their candidate selection strategies based on the type of electoral rule and the presence of a quota. Second, I run both an incentivized laboratory experiment and a survey experiment replicating these strategic dynamics. In total, my findings suggest that parties are strategic in weighing the value of diversity and experience when selecting candidates and creating party lists. This has important implications for understanding parties’ strategic incentives when they attempt to diversify their membership and face a potential trade-off when selecting diverse yet less experienced candidates.

Committee Members: Christopher Reenock (co-Chair), Jens Großer (co-Chair), Amanda Driscoll, Ana Catalano Weeks (Uni. of Bath)